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This paper looks at the underlying determinants of bank resolution costs.  In the spirit of 
James (1991), resolution costs are modeled as functions of problem assets.  However, we 
extend previous work by looking at more recent failures (from 1986 through 1992) and by 
extending our specification to include proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered 
deposits, and both regional and size effects.  Unlike James, we find no evidence that capital 
reflects net unbooked losses. On the other hand, we find roles for fraud, off-balance-sheet 
items, and both regional and size dummies.  We also find evidence suggesting that regulators 
may have practiced forbearance. 
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The last decade was marked by a record rate of  post-Depression bank failures.  From 1982 
through the end of  1992, 1,429 banks were closed, accounting for 71 percent of  all those 
closed since the inception of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1934. 
More striking, however, were the record losses that were posted.  The cost to the FDIC of 
resolving bank failures averaged 21 percent of total closed-bank assets from 1986 through 
1992.  By comparison, Benston et al. (1986) report that losses to depositors during the 1930- 
33 period of  bank failures represented only about 0.81 percent of  total failed-bank assets. 
In response to the record number of  bank closings and the skyrocketing costs of 
resolving nonviable banks, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of  1991 (FDICIA).  The main provisions of  FDICIA sought to remove a 
certain degree of discretion from bank regulators in dealing with troubled depository 
institutions.  The most notable of  these provisions include prompt corrective action and 
limitations on the Federal Reserve's discount window.'  With these legal constraints on 
forbearance, Congress hoped to reduce the ultimate costs of  resolving closed banks. 
The degree to which FDICIA will meet its goals will critically depend on the 
correlation between book measures of  net worth (the relevant measure of net worth for 
prompt corrective action) and economic net worth (the relevant measure for determining 
losses).  Therefore, FDICIA-mandated closure rules will be effective only if they are binding 
on regulators, that is, if  they force earlier closings than do unconstrained closure rules. This, 
of  course, hinges on the lag between the realization of  losses on assets and their recognition 
'  For  a discussion of prompt corrective action, see Carnell (1992) and Pike and Thomson (1992).  For  a 
discussion of FDICIA's discount window provisions, see Todd (1993). 
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This paper looks at the underlying determinants of bank resolution costs and provides 
some evidence of a significant lag between the realization and recognition of losses on bank 
assets.  Our approach is in the spirit of James (1991) and Bovenzi and Murton (1988) in that 
we model resolution costs as a function of problem assets, risky assets, and core deposits. 
We depart from those early studies in three ways.  First, our research is more current: We 
look at FDIC commercial banks closed between 1986 and 1992, while James's sample 
includes banks closed from 1985 through the middle of  1988.  Second, our measures of 
problem assets are taken from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council's 
(FFIEC) Quarterly Reports of  Income and Condition (call reports).  James uses confidential 
examination data.  Finally, we extend our basic specification, which is analogous to that of 
James, to include proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered deposits, and both 
regional and size effects. All of  these variables are found to be significant determinants of 
closed-bank resolution costs.  Several alternative specifications are rejected by the data. 
11.  Three Faces of Closed-Bank Resolution Costs 
The ultimate cost of resolving an insolvent bank derives from three sources.  First, there are 
the losses that reflect the underlying insolvency of  the bank.  These losses are the realization 
of  the downside risk associated with a bank's  investment and financing decisions.  On an 
economist's extended balance sheet, these losses equal the negative market net worth of the 
firm (excluding the value of government guarantees).  When looking at a historical cost 
accounting balance sheet, these losses will initially be unbooked losses.  Net unbooked losses 
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balance sheet, and its off-balance-sheet activities. 
The second component of  resolution costs are the losses related to f~rbearance.~ 
Forbearance arises because, as Kane (1986) argues, bank regulators face constraints regarding 
information, funding, administrative and legal issues, and political considerations in dealing 
with insolvent banks.  As a result, regulators adopt socially suboptimal closure rules. 
Forbearance losses are the those incurred after the depository is no longer economically viable 
but before it is c10sed.~ 
Finally, there are the costs associated with receivership, including administrative and 
legal expenses.  For example, expenses for the FDIC's division of  liquidation averaged 8.3 
percent of  collections in 1991 (see the FDIC's  1991 Annual Rep~rt).~  Moreover, at the end of 
1992, the FDIC's estimated contingent liability for unresolved legal cases was $404 million. 
Costs of  receivership also include losses that arise from the inefficient asset salvage operation 
of  the receiver (see Kane [1990]). 
In principle, it is difficult to separate resolution cost into its three components.  To do 
so would require a model that predicts economic insolvency, a model of  the regulatory 
Although  the costs of  forbearance have not been explicitly calculated for banks, DeGe~aro  and Thomson 
(1992) find that these costs were considerable for thrifts. 
3Allen and Saunders (1993) model deposit insurance as a callable perpetual put option.  The value of 
forbearance is the difference between the value of  the call option under unconstrained regulatory closure rules 
and its value under constrained closure rules. 
James (1991, table I) reports that administrative and legal expenses associated with bank closings were 
9.96 percent of  failed bank assets in 1985 and 1986.  James'  expense numbers are substantially higher than the 
FDIC's  total administrative and legal expenses, which were 3.6 percent of  failed bank assets for those years (see 
the FDIC's  1986 Annual Report).  They are, however, similar to the FDIC's  division of  liquidation expenses as 
a percent of  recoveries on  receivership assets held by  the FDIC for 1985 and  1986. 
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closing each bank. While Thomson7s  (1992) two-step model of  the closure decision extends 
the bank failure literature by explicitly separating economic insolvency from the closure rule, 
there is considerable work left to be done on measuring and predicting insolvency and on 
modeling regulatory closure rules.5 Furthermore, little case-specific data on receivership costs 
is available, let alone the marginal receivership cost for each closed institution.  Ultimately, 
therefore, we are left with estimating a resolution cost equation that includes all three types of 
resolution costs in the dependent variable. 
111.  The Data and Empirical Model 
The sample includes all FDIC- and Bank Insurance Fund @IF)- insured commercial banks 
that were closed or required FDIC financial assistance to remain open from January 1, 1986 
through December 31, 1992.  Quarterly balance sheet and income data for these banks are 
from the FFIEC7s  call reports from March 3 1, 1984 through December 3 1, 1992.  Closure 
data, expected resolution cost (to the FDIC), and resolution type are from FDIC (1993). 
We started with an empirical model similar to that in James (1991) by relating 
resolution costs (loss on assets in James) to sources of unbooked gains and losses on the 
bank's  extended balance sheet.  Unlike James, however, who had access to confidential data 
on asset quality and individual receivership cases, our proxies for unbooked gains and losses 
are constructed from balance sheet data reported on the quarterly call reports. 
Table I contains a complete list of the proxy variables that we ultimately analyze in 
For a review  of  the bank failure literature, see Demirgiic-Kunt (1989). 
4 
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(1993, appendix A).  OREO, PD3090 (loans past due 30 days), and PDNA are initial proxy 
variables for asset quility.  Given that the primary source of  unbooked losses are losses on 
the asset portfolio, on-book problem assets should be a good proxy for the unbooked losses. 
CORE controls for the franchise (charter) value associated with core deposits (Keeley [1990]) 
and is a source of  unbooked gains.  Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) argue that the FDIC will 
close banks in a manner that preserves the value of  the charter in order to minimize its losses. 
ICORE is included in the model to control for the loss of  the charter when the FDIC chooses 
liquidation as its resolution ~ption.~ 
UNCOL is a proxy for problem assets not reported by the bank.  As Bovenzi and 
Murton (1988) note, distressed banks have incentives to cover up the number of  problem 
assets in their portfolio.  One method for doing this is to book income on a nonperforming 
loan to prevent it from being classified as past due or nonaccruing.  Therefore, UNCOL 
should be positively correlated with unbooked losses.  Book equity plus reserves, CAP, 
represents the cushion between the value of  assets and the promised payments to debt holders. 
NCRASST is included as a proxy for portfolio risk. 
Initially, then, to be as close to James (1991) as possible, we estimate the following 
equation by  weighted least squares, where the regressors are dated four to six months before 
the closure date: 
6 The FDIC has three basic choices in handling a troubled bank.  First, it can liquidate the bank by selling 
its assets and paying off the deposits.  Second, it can sell the closed bank to another financial institution.  By 
selling the bank, the FDIC can preserve the value of its charter and thereby reduce the resolution costs by the 
amount of  the premium the acquirer is willing to pay  for this intangible asset.  Finally, the FDIC can seek to 
preserve the charter's value through a direct capital infusion, known as open bank assistance.  For a more 
thorough discussion of  FDIC closed-bank resolution options, see Caliguire and Thomson (1987). 
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+  a,ICORE  + a,UNCOL + %CAP + %NCRASST + E. 
We then test several alternative specifications relating to the inclusion of  off-balance- 
sheet items, insider loans, and brokered deposits. We also test for whether to lump together 
PD3090 and PDNA, OBSLNS and OBSOTHER. For the resulting specification, we then test 
for differences across size categories and regions. Regarding the size categories, we looked at 
differences across filer types (filer type is related to size) and across the size categories 
defined by  the dummies DSZ1-DSZ6. Regarding regional effects, we examined  differences 
across the regions defined by  the regional dummies in the table and also tested for the 
inclusion of  three variables capturing regional variation in banking conditions. 
Next,  we perform both stepwise and backwards regressions that consider the entire list 
of  variables discussed above. Finally, we estimate the resulting specification for the five cases 
when the regressors are dated four to six months before closure, six to nine months before 
closure, 12 to 15 months before closure, 24 to 27 months before closure, and 36 to 39 months 
before closure. 
The average resolution cost (RESCOST) for banks in the sample was $19.813 million, 
or 21 percent of  failed bank assets.  Table I1 presents sample statistics for the regressors for 
the five fixed time intervals before closure.  From table II, we see that the average size of 
banks closed was $141 million in assets.  Moreover, looking at TOTASS across the 
subsamples, we find that these banks shrank considerably in the year prior to c10sure.~ A 
Data reported in the last two panels of table II do not include observations on  some of the banks closed in 
1986 and  1987.  Therefore, while the data suggest that these banks may  have shrunk for up  to three years prior 
to closure, differences in  the sample across time make it difficult to interpret differences in these means. 
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exposure.  As one would expect, both  capital and asset quality deteriorate in the last year 
before closure. Because balance-sheet items are unreliable immediately before closure, we 
confine our initial focus to the specification where the regressors are lagged four to six 
months prior to closure. 
IV.  Empirical Results 
Following James (1991), equation 2 is estimated using weighted least squares, where 
the observations are weighted by  one over the square root of  total assets, with all regressors 
dated four to six months prior to closure. 
(2) RESCOST = 1033.395  + 0.522 OREO + 0.511 PD3090 + 0.456 PDNA 
(380.512)'  (0.060)'  (0.177)'  (0.047) 
- 0.019 CORE + 0.045 ICORE + 11.107 UNCOL -  1.315 CAP 
(0.008)'  (0.009)'  (0.934)'  (0.077)' 
+ 0.07 1 NCRASST + E 
(0.017)' 
Adj. R~:  0.798. 
No.  of  Obs.:  1121. 
# = Significant  at the 1% confidence level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The results show that, on average, loans 30 days past due (PD3090) and loans that 
are past due 90 days or are nonaccruing (PDNA) increase resolution costs by  51 cents and 46 
cents on the dollar, respectively.  Also, as expected, holdings of  other real estate owned 
(OREO) and other risky assets (NCRASST) raise the costs of  resolution. Each dollar of  core 
deposits reduces resolution costs by  1.9 cents. As in James, the positive and significant 
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resolved through liquidation. 
The coefficient on  UNCOL is consistent with the interpretation that distressed banks 
use this item to hide growing asset-quality problems. Bovenzi and Murton (1988) note that 
income earned but not collected can arise from legitimate activities such as investments in 
real estate, where both the principal and interest are paid at maturity. However, we doubt that 
the magnitude of  the estimated coefficient can be explained completely by  such legitimate 
activities. 
In James (1991), the coefficient on capital in the loss-on-assets equation is expected 
to be equal to zero if  there are no  unbooked gains or losses on  assets. Here, on the other 
hand, since the dependent variable is resolution cost, we expect the coefficient on  CAP to 
equal -1 in the absence of  unbooked gains and 1osses.The estimated coefficient on  CAP is 
both negative and significantly different from -1. Thus, we are in agreement with James in 
finding evidence of  net unbooked losses. 
We then consider adding, separately, OBS, INSLNS, and BRKDEP.8 Standard F-tests 
imply that OBS and INSLNS (F,~,,,,  = 202.420) belong in our specification, but do not imply 
adding BRKDEP once OBS and INSLNS (F,,,,08 = 1.713) are included. F-tests also suggest 
that we split OBS into its components, OBSLNS and OBSOTHER (F,,,,,,  = 83.458) and that 
we do not aggregate PD3090 and PDNA into a composite category (F,,,,,,  = 7.145). 
(3) RESCOST = 329.181 + 0.493 ORE0 - 0.462 PD3090 + 0.807 PDNA 
(345.404)  (0.056)'  (0.172)'  (0.052)' 
8~ater  on, when we consider regional effects, we include three additional non-dummy variables, BF (business 
failures), BFLIAB (liabilities of business failures), and PC1 (an index of personal consumption) in stepwise and 
backwards regressions. None of these variables is included in the resulting specification. 
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(0.009)#  (0.008)'  (0.907)#  (0.073)# 
+ 0.248 NCRASST - 0.186 OBSLN - 0.054 OBSOTHER + 2.783 INSLNS 
(0.02 I)#  (0.0 16)'  (0.007)#  (0.267)' 
Adj. R2: 0.814. 
No. of  Obs.:  1121. 
# = Significant at the 1% confidence level. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
In equation (3), the coefficients on both categories of  off-balance-sheet items are 
negative and significant. In the case of  off-balance-sheet loan items (OBSLN), such as loan 
commitments and letters of  credit, we can interpret the negative coefficient as indicating 
market discipline. For OBSOTHER, a negative coefficient is consistent with derivative 
securities being used  to hedge against on-balance-sheet risk.9 
The coefficient on loans to insiders (INSLNS) is expected to be negative if the bank 
relaxed credit standards in making such loans. However, under this explanation we  would not 
expect the coefficient to exceed one, as is the case here. This is consistent with Thomson's 
(1991,1992) interpretation of INSLNS as a proxy for fraud.'' 
The augmented specification (3) is next estimated separately by  filer type, referring 
to the FFIEC form submitted. The four categories are 1) banks with domestic and foreign 
offices, 2) banks with only domestic offices and total assets no more than $100 million, 3) 
banks with only domestic offices and total assets between $100 million and $300 million, 4) 
'see  Avery and Berger (1991), Boot and Thakor (1991), and Koppenhaver and Stover (1991). 
10  Graham and Horner (1988) find that fraud was a significant factor in the failure of  35 percent of  national 
banks closed between  1979 and 1987. 
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reject the restriction that the coefficients are equal across filer types (F,,,,,,  = 16.434). Since 
filer type does not exactly correspond to size, we also estimate the same specification for 
each of the dummy variable categories, DSZ1-DSZ6. We reject the restriction that the 
coefficients are equal across these size categories (F33,110  = 4.401).11 We then estimate the 
same specification for all banks, but with the size dummies included as regressors. To avoid 
the dummy variable trap, we must exclude either the intercept or one of  the dummies.12 
We follow a similar procedure regarding regional effects. First, we estimate (3) for 
each region, where each region is chosen by  the dummy variables, DUMSE, DUMHP, 
DUMSW, DUMWE, DUMMW, and DUMNE. We reject the restriction that the coefficients 
are equal across regions (F,,llo,  = 16.486).13  Then we estimate the same specification with 
five of the regional dummies (excluding DUMNE) on the right-hand side with an intercept. 
It is well known that such a resulting specification may be sensitive to the order in 
which variables are entered, so we next analyze the total list of  variables using both stepwise 
and backwards regression. At this point, we also include in the list three variables that may 
capture variation in regional economic conditions: BF, BFLIAB, and PCI. Because the 
backwards regression procedure starts with the full list of potential regressors, we must leave 
out one of the size dummies (DSZ1) and one of the regional dummies (DUMNE). At this 
11 This test statistic was calculated for the restriction that the coefficients are equal across the four categories: 
DSZ1=1, DSZ2=1, DSZ3=1, and all other banks. 
'%ecause  the size category for DSZ6 includes only five banks, including that dummy implies almost perfect 
collinearity. Also, OBSOTHER is not reported for the smallest banks (DSZ1=1). 
13~he  specification is different for DUMMW=l because OBSOTHER is missing. 
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(1980). We deem that a component  induces harmful collinearity when its condition index is 
over 30. We also deem that the standard error of a particular coefficient estimate has been 
unacceptably degraded  if  a high proportion of its variance is associated with a component 
with a high condition index. 
The results from the stepwise and backwards regressions are broadly similar. All of 
the non-dummy variables belong, with the exception of the three regional conditions measures 
(BF, BFLIAB, and PCI) and PD3090.  Also, BRKDEP now appears in the final specification 
even though our original test implied its exclusion. There are differences between the two 
procedures regarding the regional and size dummies. With the backwards regressions, all of 
the size and regional dummies are kept, other than those that had to be excluded (DSZ1 and 
DUMNE) to avoid the dummy variable trap. The collinearity diagnostics for each procedure 
did indicate that the final component induced harmful collinearity.  However, as all t-statistics 
implied significance at the 1 percent level, we did not redo the backwards and stepwise 
procedures with a reduced list of regressors.  The final specification of the model as indicated 
by the stepwise procedure (using data for the four- to six-month time horizon) is 
(4) RESCOST =  a, + a,UNCOL + qCAP  + %PDNA + a40RE0  + a,INSLNS 
+ a6NCRASST + qOBSLN + qOBSOTHER + %CORE + a,, ICORE 
+ a,,DSZ6 + a,,DSZl  + a,,DSZ2  + a14DSZ3  + a,,BRKDEP 
+ al6DUMNE + a,,DSZ4  + a,,DUMSW  + E. 
In Table 111, we report the weighted least squares results for equation (4) when that 
11 
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Overall, the results for the four- to six-month time-to-closure horizon are consistent 
with those for specifications (1) and (2).  The coefficients on UNCOL, PDNA, OREO, 
INSLNS, ICORE, and NCRASST are positive and significant, while the coefficients on CAP, 
CORE, OBSLN, and OBSOTHER are negative and significant.  Moreover, while there are 
some minor differences in terms of the size of the coefficients across equations, qualitatively 
the results are the same as those for specifications (1) and (2). 
The coefficient on brokered deposits is negative and significant, suggesting that 
banks'  reliance on money markets for funding reduces ultimate resolution costs.  One could 
interpret this result as a sign of market discipline.  Another possible conclusion is that 
troubled banks that are heavily reliant on brokered funds are more likely to be subject to 
prompt closure.  This interpretation is consistent with Thomson's (1992) model of the 
regulatory closure decision. 
The coefficients on the size dummies are consistent with a direct relationship 
between the fixed costs associated with resolving a closed bank and the bank's  asset size. 
Finally, the positive and significant coefficients on DUMNE and DUMSW indicate that the 
depressed economies in the Northeast and Southwest contributed significantly to the costs of 
resolving failed banks in those regions. 
Interpretation  of the results for equation (4) estimated using data more than six 
months before closing is not as straightforward as that for the four- to six-month results. 
However, a cursory look at each coefficient across the five different subsamples indicates 
regulatory forbearance.  Our ability to explain expected resolution costs at time of closure 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmusing data up to 39 months before the closure date suggests that banks closed between 1986 
and 1992 were insolvent long before their doors were shut.  Moreover, the pattern of 
individual regression coefficients across time-to-closure subsarnples indicates an increase in 
unbooked losses, the further one gets from the closure date.  For example, the coefficients on 
PDNA and ORE0 rise monotonically with the time-to-closure horizon. 
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have extended previous examinations of the determinants of bank 
failure-resolution costs. We examine the balance-sheet determinants of the FDIC's estimated 
cost of resolution and confirm most of the findings of James (1991), who looked at loss on 
assets and used confidential examiner reports. However, unlike James, we find no evidence 
that our capital variable reflects net unbooked losses in addition to the other variables 
included in the analysis.14 In addition, we find a role for insider loans, off-balance-sheet 
items, and both regional and size dummies. 
When we extend the interval between the observation of the banks'  balance sheets 
and the time of  closure, we find that the balance-sheet data can still explain a high percentage 
of  the resolution costs.  This suggests that regulators may have practiced forbearance. 
Our research can be extended in several directions. First, modeling the regulators' 
closure decisions by adding an equation to predict closure would allow us to focus more 
carefully on the role of forbearance in explaining resolution costs. Second, examining the 
14we do find evidence of  unbooked losses in our capital variable when we estimate our base model (equation 
[I]), which was motivated by James (1991).  However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
capital variable equals -1 once off-balance-sheet items and insider loans are included in the model (equations [3] and 
PI). 
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balance-sheet items and regulatory response. These changes would also permit further 
identification of the roles of insider loans and off-balance-sheet items. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable I:  Variable Definitions 
VARIABLE  SIGN"  DESCRIPTION 
- 
RESCOST  NA  The estimated cost to the FDIC of resolving the bank, as reported in FDIC 
(1993, appendix A). 
UNCOL  +  Interest income earned on  loans that is uncollected. 
CAP  Equity capital plus the loan loss reserve and allocated risk transfer reserve. 
PDNA  +  Loans that are 90 days past due but still accruing, and nonaccrual loans. 
ORE0  +  Other real estate owned. 
TNSLNS  +  Loans to insiders. 
NCRASST  +  Risky assets that are not included in  the totals for  OREO, PD30 (loans that 
are 30 days past due but still accruing), PDNA, or loans to insiders. 
OBSLN  ?  The total notional value of  loan commitments, loan sales, and standby 
letters of credit reported. 
OBSOTHER  ?  The total notional value of  other off-balance-sheet items reported by  banks. 
CORE  Core deposits:  measured as domestic deposits under $100,000. 
ICORE  +  Equals CORE if  the bank was resolved via a payout. 
TOTASS  NA  Total on-balance-sheet assets. 
Size Dummy Variables 
DSZ 1  ?  = 1 if  TOTASS I  $50 million, 0 otherwise; 
DSZ2  ?  = 1 if  $50 million c  TOTASS I  $100 million, 0 otherwise; 
DSZ3  ?  = 1 if  $100 million c  TOTASS I  $500 million, 0 otherwise; 
DSZ4  ?  = 1 if  $500 million c  TOTASS I  $1 billion, 0 otherwise; 
DSZ5  ?  = 1 if  $1 billion c  TOTASS I  $5 billion, 0 otherwise; 
DSZ6  ?  = 1 if  $5 billion c  TOTASS, 0 otherwise. 
Regional Dummy Variables (defined by Federal Reserve District) 
DUMSE  ?  = 1 if  the bank is in the Richmond or Atlanta Fed District; 
DUMMW  ?  = 1 if  the bank is in the Cleveland, Chicago, or St. Louis Fed District; 
DUMSW  ?  = 1 if the bank is in the Dallas Fed District; 
DUMHP  ?  = 1 if the bank is in the Minneapolis or Kansas City Fed District; 
DUMWE  ?  = 1 if  the bank is in the San Francisco Fed District; 
DUMNE  ?  = 1 if  the bank is in the Boston, New  York, or Philadelphia Fed District. 
Notes:  a.  Expected sign for the regression coefficient in  equations (I), (2), or (3). 
Source: Authors. Table III: WLS RESULTS FOR EQUATION 3" 
X Months c  Call Report < Y Months before ~ailure 
Regressor  4 to 6 
UNCOL  4.3759 
(0.8926)' 
CAP  -1.1649 
(0.07 19)' 
PDNA  0.7864 
(0.0492)' 
INSLNS  1.775 1 
(0.2763)' 
NCRASST  0.2019 
(0.020 1)' 
OBSLN  -0.1576 
(0.0160)' 
OBSOTHER  -0.0384 
(0.0074)# 
CORE  -0.0879 
(0.0097)' 
ICORE  0.06 18 
(0.0088)# 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 111 (continued): WLS RESULTS FOR  EQUATION 3" 
X Months c  Call Report < Y Months Before Failure 
-  -  -  - - 
Regressor  4 to 6  6 to 9  12 to 15  24 to 27  36 to 39 
DSZl  -69250  8 1400  130498  - 16740  -2655 1 
(1  3290)'  (12977)'  (13996)'  (14641)#  (1  68 18)' 
BRKDEP  -0.0949  -0.07 13  -0.2 199  -0.3452  -0.2030 
(0.0336)'  (0.0337)'  (0.0485)'  (0.0967)'  (0.08 19)' 
DUMNE  5856.8943  6777.7280  10253  14426  19096 
(1692.769)'  (1714.668)'  (1792.589)'  (1990.963)'  (2137.523  1)' 
DUMSW  1345.0192  1241.1026  1884.2187  956.4019  13  19.4845 
(593.1 150)'  (608.253)'  (641.4230)'  (755.178)'  (878.5572)' 
Notes:  Sample includes all FDIC-insured banks that failed from January 1986 through December  1992. 
Data are from the FFIEC Quarterly Reports of  Condition and Income from January 1984 through 
December 1992 and from the FDIC (1993). 
a) Observations are weighted by  one over the square root of  total  assets. 
b)  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
':  Significantly different fiom zero at the 1 percent confidence level. 
Source: Authors. 
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